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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Amanda Jenquine entered a guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, preserving
her right to challenge the district court's order denying her motion to suppress. Mindful that the
court's ruling is consistent with the applicable legal standards, Ms. Jenquine asserts the district
court erred by denying her motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Amanda Jenquine by criminal complaint with possession of
methamphetamine, and by citation with possession of an open container of alcohol by a driver.
(R., pp.11-14.) During the preliminary hearing, Officer Eric Bailey of the Rathdrum Police
Department testified that he first encountered Ms. Jenquine after he saw a vehicle parked behind
a closed restaurant, facing the wrong way near the drive-thru window, a little before 1:00 am.
(Tr. Prelim, p.3, L.17 - p.6, L.3; p.16, Ls.21 - p.17, L.1.) The vehicle had not been in that
location earlier that night, so Officer Bailey approached the vehicle and saw Ms. Jenquine
sleeping in the driver's seat, with an open container of alcohol near her. (Tr. Prelim, p.5, L.2 p.6, L.14.) Suspicious that Ms. Jenquine may have driven under the influence of alcohol, Officer
Bailey knocked on the window waking Ms. Jenquine, and he had her perform field sobriety tests,
which she failed. (Tr. Prelim, p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.8.) Officer Bailey then detained Ms. Jenquine,
putting handcuffs on her and placing her in the back of his patrol car, intending to conduct a
breath test. (Tr. Prelim, p.7, Ls.9-19.)
After placing Ms. Jenquine in the back of his patrol car, Officer Bailey looked through
the window of her vehicle at the suggestion of a cover officer, he saw a baggie containing a
suspected controlled substance, and he arrested Ms. Jenquine for possession of a controlled
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substance.

(Tr. Prelim, p.7, L.24 - p.8, L.21; p.34, Ls.3-14.) Officer Bailey then searched

Ms. Jenquine's purse and found a folded up $50 bill that contained a similar substance, which the
State forensic lab verified was methamphetamine.

(Tr. Prelim, p.8, L.22 - p.13, L.23.)

Ms. J enquine was bound over into the district court and the State filed an information charging
her with possession of methamphetamine, and misdemeanor possession of an open container of
alcohol by a driver, but she was not charged with driving under the influence. (Augmentation) 1
Ms. Jenquine filed a motion to suppress, asserting that her "Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights enumerated in the Constitution of the United States of America, and her
rights set forth and enumerated in Article I §§ 13 and 17 of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho," were violated. (R., pp.69-79.) Specifically, Ms. Jenquine asserted that Officer Bailey
seized her without a reasonable, articulable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity
because, although she "initially stated she had begun to drink prior to arriving . . . she clarified
twice that she had begun drinking only after parking the vehicle in its current location," and she
was not charged with driving under the influence. (R., pp.71, 75-76.) Ms. Jenquine also asserted
that she was denied her right to counsel because Officer Bailey did not let her contact her
attorney prior to conducting field sobriety tests, arguing that because Officer Bailey did not have
reasonable grounds to believe Ms. Jenquine had been drinking prior to driving, he did not have
reasonable grounds to conduct the tests. (R., pp.76-77.) Finally, Ms. Jenquine argued that her
seizure was unreasonably extended by Officer Bailey administering the field sobriety tests,
including a second horizontal gaze nystagmus test. (R., pp. 77-78.)
In response, the State argued that Officer Bailey had an objectively reasonable suspicion
that Ms. Jenquine had driven under the influence of alcohol, may have been planning to break
1

Ms. Jenquine has filed a motion to augment the record with a copy of the information filed in
her case. The motion to augment is pending.
2

into the restaurant, or was engaged in some type of drug activity, and Officer Bailey had an
obligation to ensure she was fit to drive. (R., pp.89-91.) The State noted that Officer Bailey was
not required to accept Ms. Jenquine's claim that she only started drinking after the car was
parked, and that he did not know what kind of intoxicating substance Ms. Jenquine may have
been under the influence of, or whether she posed a threat to herself or others. (R., pp.90-91.)
The State further argued that the methamphetamine was seen in plain view; therefore, Officer
Bailey had probable cause to search the rest of the vehicle, including Ms. Jenquine's purse which
contained additional methamphetamine. (R., pp.91-92.) The State argued that Ms. Jenquine's
Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not implicated because she was not subject to a custodial
interrogation, and her Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach until after she was
arrested.

(R., pp.92-95.)

Finally, the State argued that Ms. Jenquine's detention was not

unlawfully extended, and the methamphetamine would have been inevitably discovered because
it was seen in plain view. (R., pp.95-97.)
In reply, Ms. Jenquine first asserted that the State could not rely upon justifications for
Ms. Jenquine's detention that Officer Bailey did not assert during the preliminary hearing; that
any suspicion Ms. Jenquine may have attempted to break into the closed restaurant was dispelled
when Officer Bailey saw that she was sleeping; and that Officer Bailey's suspicion that
Ms. Jenquine may have driven while under the influence was dispelled when she told him that
she had not started drinking until after she parked the car. (R., pp.99-102.) Ms. Jenquine further
argued that the Officer Bailey unreasonably extended the stop when he asked her to participate in
field sobriety tests, reasoning that her statement that she did not drink until after she parked
dispelled any suspicion of her driving under the influence, and that but for removing her from the
vehicle, the methamphetamine would not have been seen. (R., pp.102-04.) At the very least,
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Ms. Jenquine reasoned, the second HGN test unreasonably extended the stop. (R., p.104.) She
argued, "[h]ad Amanda never been rousted from the vehicle; or, allowed to return to her vehicle
on that late, cold night, after the usual field sobriety tests she would have sat down, the
contraband would have never been discovered by law enforcement." (R., p.104.) Ms. Jenquine
further argued that the State failed to show that the methamphetamine would have been seen in
plain view if she had not been asked to perform the field sobriety tests. (R., pp.104-05.) Finally,
Ms. Jenquine again argued that her right to an attorney was violated, because Officer Bailey did
not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to require her to perform the field sobriety tests.
(R., p.105.)
During the suppression hearing, Ms. Jenquine submitted three video files: two files from
Officer Bailey's body cam, and one from his cover officer's body cam. (Tr. 9/10/19, p.11, L.6 p.14, L.5; p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.2; Ex. A.) Officer Bailey testified that when he first approached
Ms. Jenquine's vehicle he was performing a welfare check, but he began to suspect that she had
driven under the influence because she was slurring her speech, and he smelled the odor of
alcohol when she opened her door. (Tr. 9/10/19, p.18, L.22 - p.20, L.2.) Ms. Jenquine admitted
to Officer Bailey that she drove to the restaurant, but told him at one point that she did not start
drinking until after she parked; Officer Bailey did not believe Ms. Jenquine so he had her
perform standard field sobriety tests, which she failed. (Tr. 9/10/19, p.27, L.7 - p.28, L.19; p.34,
L.19-p.35, L.2.) Officer Bailey then looked through the window of Ms. Jenquine's car and saw
the methamphetamine on the driver's seat, after being told of its presence by a cover officer.
(Tr. 9/10/19, p.29, Ls.3-21.) Officer Bailey acknowledged that he wrote in his report that he did
not cite Ms. Jenquine for driving under the influence, based upon her statement that she did not
begin to drink until after she parked.

(Tr. 9/10/19, p.23, Ls.6-12.)
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Officer Bailey further

acknowledged that the field sobriety tests would not have shown exactly when Ms. Jenquine
began consuming alcohol, other than showing it would not have been immediately before
performing the tests. (Tr. 9/10/19, p.30, L.3 -p.33, L.10.)
Counsel for Mr. Jenquine argued that there was no basis for Officer Bailey to conduct a
DUI investigation because the field sobriety tests would neither confirm nor dispel whether
Ms. Jenquine consumed alcohol before or after she drove, and the methamphetamine would not
have been discovered but for Ms. Jenquine performing the FSTs. (Tr. 9/10/19, p.37, L.20 - p.40,
L.18; p.42, L.21 - p.43, L.23.) The State argued the methamphetamine on the driver's seat was
discovered in plain view during a DUI investigation that was justified at its inception, and that
Officer Bailey was not required to believe Ms. J enquine when she said she did not start drinking
until after she parked. (Tr. 9/10/19, p.40, L.22 - p.42, L.19.) The district court took the matter
under advisement, noting that the issue "is really going to come down as to whether there was
reasonable suspicion for the DUI investigation at the inception of the investigation of the
encounter, so to speak." (Tr. 9/10/19, p.44, Ls.1-5.)
The district court issued a written decision denying Ms. Jenquine's motion to suppress.
(R., pp.166-82.) Based on Officer Bailey's body cam footage, the district court determined that
Officer Bailey's initial conversation with Ms. Jenquine went as follows:
Defendant: Hello?
Officer: How's it going?
Defendant: Good. How are you?
Officer: Not too bad. What are you doing here?
Defendant: I was taking a nap.
Officer: Taking a nap?
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Defendant: Yeah.
Officer: Okay. How much of that hard alcohol have you had to drink?
Defendant: What?
Officer: How much of the bottle of alcohol have you had to drink tonight?
Defendant: Not much.
Officer: Not much? Okay. Do you got your driver's license on you by chance?
Defendant: (looks through purse). It's my old one, I don't know if that'll work.
Officer: As long as it's got a name and a birthday that'll work.
Defendant: (unintelligible) Here's the old one. (hands expired Idaho I.D. card to
officer).
Officer: Okay.
Defendant: I have the new one on me, I'm just gonna find it. Here, there's my
new one. (hands over Idaho driver's license)
Officer: There's the new one. Okay. Where were you drinking at? Were you
drinkingDefendant: Yeah, I was drinking before I even got here.
Officer: Okay. And how long have you been sleeping here?
Defendant: Uh, what time is it?
Officer: It is 12:30 right now.
Defendant: (unintelligible) Probably around four or five.
Officer: Four or five minutes, four or five --?
Defendant: Four or five in the afternoon.
Officer: Okay.
(asks Defendant if there are any issues with her driver's license, steps
away to run license through dispatch)
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Officer: All right. So, Amanda, I mean you drove here, correct?
Defendant: Okay.
Officer: You said that you had driven hereDefendant: Yeah.
Officer: Okay. I can obviously tell that you've been drinking tonight.
Defendant: Yeah.
Officer: So, I'm going to have you jump out and do some field sobriety for me
real quick, okay?
Defendant: I'm not driving though. So am I under arrest?
Officer: Okay, but you drove to this point.
Defendant: Yeah, but I drank before I even got here.
Officer: Okay, but like I said, I can smell that you've been drinking.
Defendant: Okay, but I'm notOfficer: You drove to this point Defendant: And my car is off, so am I under arrest?
Officer: Okay. You already admitted that you drove to here.
Defendant: Yes.
Officer: Okay. So that's why I'm asking you to step out and do some field
sobrietyDefendant: I'm just asking, am I under arrest?
Officer: Okay. That's why I'm asking you to step out and do some field sobriety
tests for me.
Defendant: Which I can, but I haven't been driving, so I'm just asking, am I under
arrest?
Officer: Okay. Right now you're being detained for investigation of a DUI.
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Defendant: But I have no keys in my car, so I haven't been Officer: You still drove to this location.
Defendant: I drove to this location before I was drinking, so I don't understand
why I have to take a field sobriety. I don't have my keys in my car.
(R., pp.167-70.)

The court noted that Ms. Jenquine submitted to the field sobriety tests,

including a second HGN test that was necessary due to her long eyelashes. (R., p.170.) Officer
Bailey then handcuffed Ms. Jenquine and placed her in the back of his patrol car. (R., p.170.)
The court found that at some point during the encounter, two other officers arrived on the scene,
and that while Officer Bailey was performing the second HGN test, one of the officers saw the
suspected controlled substance in plain view on the driver's seat of her car. (R., p.170.) The
substance tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine, and Ms. Jenquine was arrested
for possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.170.) Additional methamphetamine was found
in a folded-up bill in Ms. Jenquine's purse. (R., p.170.)
The district court held Officer Bailey held an objectively reasonable suspicion that
Ms. Jenquine had driven under the influence of alcohol, and the FSTs were conducted in
furtherance of that investigation. (R., pp.173-77.) The court reasoned:
Under [State v.] Pick, [124 Idaho 601, 605 (Ct. App. 1993)], Officer Bailey
developed reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a detention of the Defendant,
and to administer field sobriety tests on the Defendant, based on Defendant's
slurred speech, her admission that she had driven to the [restaurant], and her
admission that she had been drinking that night and that she drank before she
arrived at the [restaurant], combined with Officer Bailey's other observations.
(R., p.175.) The court also noted that Officer Bailey did not need to witness Ms. Jenquine
driving in order to conduct the DUI investigation, relying upon the Court of Appeals' holding in
State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246 (Ct. App. 2014). (R., pp.175-76.) The district court noted, "[t]he
Rocha court held that the state was not required to present testimony of an eyewitness to the
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defendant's driving under the influence in order to sustain the conviction, but that it could be
proved by circumstantial evidence." (R., p.176 (citing Rocha, 157 Idaho at 250).) The court
further held that Officer Bailey did not impermissibly extend the duration of the detention by
conducting the FSTs, including the second HGN test, since he held a reasonable suspicion that
Ms. Jenquine had driven under the influence, and the second HGN test was necessary to assure
the results were accurate. (R., pp.178-79.) The court further found that the methamphetamine
on the driver's seat was admissible because it was seen by the officers in plain view, from a
place the officers had a lawful right to be: "Defendant's argument that the plain view doctrine
does not apply because the baggie would not have been in plain view but for the request for
Defendant to exit the vehicle is unavailing because this court determined that the field sobriety
tests were supported by reasonable articulable suspicion on the part of Officer Bailey."
(R., p.179.) Finally, the court held that Ms. Jenquine's rights to counsel, under both the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment, were not violated because Ms. Jenquine was not arrested until after the
methamphetamine was discovered, and she was not at any point subjected to a custodial
interrogation. (R., pp.180-81.)
Ms. Jenquine pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and to inattentive driving
stemming from a separate case, preserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to
suppress. (R., pp.187, 191-92; Tr. 11/21/19, p.5, L.10 - p.13, L.4.) The court sentenced her to a
suspended unified term of four years, with one year fixed, and placed her on probation for a
period of two years, and six months. (R., pp.217-24; Tr.2/14/20, p.13, Ls.16-20.) Ms. Jenquine
filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.225-28.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Jenquine's motion to suppress?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Jenquine's Motion To Suppress
Mindful that the district court's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence,
and the court's legal conclusions are consistent with applicable precedent, Ms. Jenquine asserts
the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Its purpose is "to
impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials,
including law enforcement agents, in order to 'safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions."'

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting

Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)). If evidence is not seized either pursuant
to a valid warrant or pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence
discovered as a result of the illegal search or seizure must be excluded as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). When reviewing a decision
on a motion to suppress, Idaho appellate Courts "accept[] the trial court's findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely review[] the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found." State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 414-15 (2017) (citation omitted).
As the district court recognized, the critical question in determining whether evidence
that Ms. Jenquine possessed methamphetamine should have been suppressed, was whether
Officer Bailey could lawfully detain Ms. Jenquine and have her perform FSTs in pursuing an
investigation into whether Ms. Jenquine had driven under the influence of alcohol. 2 (Tr. 9/10/19,

2

Ms. Jenquine's plain view and right to counsel arguments were both premised upon her
argument that Officer Bailey did not have the lawful authority to require her to perform the field
sobriety tests. (R., pp. I 04-05.) Because the district court's ruling on this issue is also dispositive
11

p.44, Ls.1-5.) The methamphetamine, in other words, would not have been discovered, had
Officer Bailey not required Ms. Jenquine to get out of her car and perform the FSTs. The critical
question in this case, was not whether it was reasonable to believe that Ms. Jenquine was under
the influence of alcohol at the time of her encounter with Officer Bailey, it is whether
Ms. Jenquine had been under the influence of alcohol earlier that night, when she drove to the
restaurant. Ms. Jenquine asserts that her performance on the FSTs would not have answered that
critical question, and therefore Officer Bailey did not use the least intrusive means to verify or
dispel his suspicion that Ms. Jenquine had driven under the influence. See Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
The facts presented in support of Ms. Jenquine's suppression motion are not in dispute.
While the district court accurately noted that Ms. Jenquine initially told Officer Bailey that she
consumed alcohol prior to driving, Ms. Jenquine also told Officer Bailey that did not start
drinking until after she had parked her car.

(R., pp.167-70; see also Ex. A (file 1).)

Ms. Jenquine's performance of the FSTs would not have determined which of her explanations
was accurate. Mindful that Idaho law recognizes that an officer may lawfully detain a person
suspected of driving under the influence, and may request that the driver perform field sobriety
tests in order to either confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions, see e.g., State v. Pick, 124 Idaho
601, 605 (Ct. App. 1993), and mindful that Idaho law also recognizes that driving under the
influence can be proven by circumstantial evidence, and an officer need to not observe the
defendant driving in order to sustain a DUI conviction, see e.g., State v. Rocha, 157 Idaho 246,
250 (Ct. App. 2014), Ms. Jenquine asserts the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress.

on whether the plain view doctrine applies, and whether Ms. Jenquine was deprived her right to
counsel, no further argument on these issues in contained in this brief.
12

CONCLUSION
Ms. Jenquine respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying her motion to suppress, vacate her judgment and sentence, and remand her case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day ofNovember, 2020.

I sf Jason C. Pintler
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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